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Abstract
The paper compares di¤erent auction formats for sale of a single patented
innovation for budget constrained bidders. This unit decreases the marginal
cost of production in the aftermarket for its owner by an amount which de-
pends on the money invested on the development of this technology. As the
bidders have a xed budget that must be used to pay the nal auction price
and also to develop the new technology, the winner has incentives to pay a
low amount for his unit to increase the amount available to invest in cost
reduction. Conversely the loser has incentives to induce induce a higher price
to be paid by the winner in order to increase aftermarket prots. This conict
of interest generates the willingness to pay (WTP) for the patent through an
endogenous process, which may end up by stablishing a higher WTP for the
lowest nanced rm. Given this background, the case in which the players
have di¤erent initial budgets may generate multiple equilibria for all studied
auction mechanisms. These equilibria produce di¤erent consumer surplus and,
thus, a central government with an unti-trust behavior is able to choose the
auction that generates the rened equilibrium leading to the highest consumer
surplus.
JEL Classication: C72, D44, L11.
Keywords: Market design, auction, aftermarket, budget constraints, investment.
Supervisor: Roberto Burguet
1 Introduction
Auction is a vetust trading device dened by several rules intending to specify an
e¢ cient market price for goods with unknown value. For such achievement it is
imperative to design the mechanism that propitiates the auctioneers eagerness ac-
cording to the market conditions.
This paper considers the auctioning of a patented innovation which brings techno-
logical advantage for its owner in the Cournot aftermarket by reducing the marginal
production cost. Needless to say that this problem itself would represent a tradi-
tional unconstrained optimization for the aftermarket preceded by an independent
decision for the auction. However the model considers budget constrained agents
who are able to invest on the patent development a value corresponding to what re-
mained after purchasing the patent on the auction. This fact modies the behavior
of the players on the auction process, transforming a usually exogenous mechanism
into an endogenous one.
Traditionally agents dont bid a value higher then their willingness to pay for
the auctioned good (See Krishna, 2002 and Burguet, 2000). Nevertheless in the
studied case this strategy may be used since the loser on the auction has incentives
to increase the price paid by the winner in order to decrease the investment applied
in cost reduction and, consequently, increase his own prot in the aftermarket.
One of the consequences of this endogenous bidding process is the possibility
of multiplicity of Nash Equilibrium (NE) prices for any traditional auction format
whenever budget asymmetry is considered1. By using game theoretical tools it turns
out that some equilibria seem more predictable then others. Then by choosing
the auction format it is possible to generate di¤erent consumer surplus related to
the rened equilibrium produced. One of the basic ndings in the Cournot model
where the two players have di¤erent marginal cost is that the consumer surplus
and the marginal cost of the low-cost rm are negatively correlated (see Shapiro,
1989). Conversely Schwartz (1989) identied necessary conditions for which lowering
equilibrium price also reduced welfare. He argues that in an oligopoly, part of a rms
gain is due to altering the market equilibrium in its favour and to the disadvantage of
the rivals. A possible mean for this achievement is investing in cost reduction, which
can reduce welfare by diminishing the equilibrium output. In the model presented,
1Pitchik (2006) concludes that in the presence of budget constraits for sequential auctions there
may exist more then one symmetric equilibrium functions di¤ernig with respect to allocation, prices
and revenue.
1
given that the players are budget constrained, the more one pays for the patent
represents less budget that may be devoted for investment and, hence, the smaller
the consumer surplus. But a new feature considered is that the amount paid for
the patent acquisition also counts as part of the consumer surplus provided that a
Government Authority is the responsible for its administration. In this case there is
the trade-o¤ between increasing the consumer surplus by changing the auction price
and the investment in cost reduction. As consequence, an anti-trust regulator may
force the auctioneers to use a given auction format that maximizes the consumers
satisfaction.
Additionally, this endogeneity may generate ine¢ cient allocation for the patented
innovation. This may occur due to the higher incentives for the weaker bidder to
avoid that his opponent wins because the losses considering the amount that he
pays are less expensive than the ones brought by the aftermarket losses whenever
his opponent wins. Also the stronger competitor prefers to avoid winning after
a certain patent price given that his losses considering that his opponent wins are
smaller then the amount that he must pay for the patent. Che and Gale (1998) study
auctions when bidders face an increasing marginal cost expenditure. They evaluate
a model with two dimensional private information in which buyers are distinguished
by their willingness to pay and ability to pay (nancial constraints). Their model
occasionally also generates ine¢ cient allocations since the good may not be acquired
by the player with highest valuation, but may instead go to a better-nanced one
with lower valuation. Maskin (1992), and Shleider and Vinshny (1992) also recognize
the possibility that a good may not be allocated to the highest-valuation buyer.
The current paper demonstrates the existence of conditions for the English auc-
tion, which produces the higher equilibrium price, to outperform the Dutch one
from the consumers point of view. The extension of this result for the sealed-bid
format is straightforward2 given that there are two bidders (which represents the
inexistence of signaling for the English auction) and the information is complete
(see Krishna, 2002). Consequently the Second Price Auction (SPA) outranks the
First Price Auction (FPA). Che and Gale (1998) found the contrary result when
considering their model with private information and exogenous valuation.
Auctions of licenses with constrained bidders are also studied by Pagnozzi (2005).
In his model weak and strong bidders compete for an auctioned good and the winner
has the option of reselling his item to the loser. In this sequential auction environ-
2Goerre (2003) shows that in an incomplete information game with signaling the English auction
is not strategically equivalent to the Second Price Auction as the cost of signaling is higher for the
English format given that the player inccurs the total cost of his signal.
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ment it is usually expected that the strong bidder will increase the price in order
to weaken its competitor, and this behavior would induce weak competitors not to
have incentives to participate on the auction since they would get null prot. But
when the budget constraints matter the author mentions that the strong bidder is
in a better bargaining position in the resale market if the weak bidder pays a low
rather than high price for the good. This induces the weak bidder to bid more ag-
gressively to increase his prots as he knows that he will win the rst auction. This
happens because the wealth constrained bidder enjoys limited liability and treats
the auction prize as an option (whenever the project seems unprotable, he may
declare bankruptcy and lose his wealth). Burguet and McAfee (2005) consider an
auction with budget constrained rms where the winners for the n auctioned goods
have the right to compete in a Cournot market. The price paid on the auction
inuences the maximum possible production cost of the rm in the aftermarket.
This means that if the auction prices are high enough, rms are not able to invest
the optimal amount in the deployment of services. Goerre (2003) also considers the
case of an auctioned patent with Cournot aftermarket, but in his case he considers
signalling with private information, and a x marginal cost reduction for the owner
of the innovation. Furthermore Benoit and Krishna (1998) demonstrate that budget
constrained bidding may be the result of conscious choice rather then of exogenous
factors as liquidity constraints or capital market imperfections for multiple-object
auctioning.
The correlation between investment and consumer surplus is studied by Bandulet
and Morasch (2003), who consider an heterogeneous good duopoly with quantity
competition. In their model there is a local rm, with no transport and cost, and a
distant one that may invest in transport cost reduction. The paper compares private
and social planners investment, arguing that the investing rm neither considers
the positive impact on consumers nor the negative e¤ect on its competitor. They
nd out that rms overinvest relative to the social optimum, which means that the
negative impact on its competitor exceeds the gain in consumer surplus.
The paper is organized as follows. The general framework in which two rms
compete for a patent innovation that reduces its owners cost for the Cournot mar-
ket according to the amount invested on its development is evaluated in Section
2. Section 3 describes the bidding strategies related to each of the studied auction
formats whenever rms have di¤erent initial budget. Considering these results Sec-
tion 4 characterizes the welfare related to the usage of each auction mechanism and,
given few conditions, establishes the English auction as the preferred format for an
anti-trust authority responsible for its design. Section 5 states the implications of
the ndings and proposes extensions.
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2 The model
Consider a Cournot duopoly with risk neutral rms producing at constant marginal
cost c and facing an aggregate demand function, i.e. P (Q) = a   bQ, where Q =
q1+q2 is the total supply of this industry. Now suppose a patented innovation, which
may reduce the marginal cost of production for its owner, is sold through an auction
at price . The buyer chooses an investment I to develop this patent and, depending
on the amount invested, the rm has a di¤erent marginal cost of production given
by the function c (I), which is strictly decreasing and convex3. In order to make
optimal decisions rms must consider their initial budget Bi for i = 1; 2, that may
be used to pay for the patent and also for investment in cost reduction. The timing
of this market interaction is displayed in table 1.
Table 1: Timetable (3-stage game):
1st stage 2nd stage 3rd stage
(Auction) (Investment) (Cournot market)
Winner Winner chooses I 1 chooses q1(I)
(Pays  for patent) ( I  B   )
Loser 2 chooses q2(I)
(Pays 0)
The following two cases will be analyzed in the paper: (i) both players have the
same budget; and (ii) their budget is di¤erent. The former enables the understand-
ing of the basic features of the model while the latter is the case in which the auction
format will have consequences on the outcome of this market.
2.1 Both players have the same budget constraint
The rst model evaluated considers the case in which both players are completely
symmetric with B1 = B2  B. The present problem is analysed by backward
induction.
3Flaherty (1980) mentions that it is commonly assumed that extra cost reduction becomes more
expensive to acquire as marginal cost reduction increases.
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2.1.1 3rd stage: Cournot market
Assume w.l.o.g. that player 1 buys the patent in the rst stage and that  is the
price he pays for it. In the second stage he has invested I on patent development
for reduction of the marginal cost of production. This results in a Cournot game
where rms 1 and 2 have marginal cost c (I) and c respectively. Thus
1 (I) = max
q1
P (Q) q1   q1c (I)  I   ; (1)
2 (I) = max
q2
P (Q) q2   q2c; (2)
where P (Q) is the continuous and di¤erentiable inverse demand function. To ensure
that this problem is strictly concave so that the Lagrange method will lead to a
unique optimal interior (qi > 0) solution, it is assumed that P 00 (Q) :Q+2P 0 (Q) < 0.
Considering the demand elasticity given by "   P
Q
@Q
@P
and denoting the market
share of player i as Si  q1Q it is possible to write the FOC as
P (Q)

1  1
"
S1

  c (I) = 0; (3)
P (Q)

1  1
"
S2

  c = 0: (4)
Equations 3 and 4 determine respectively q1 and q

2 both as a function of I.
2.1.2 2nd stage: Investment (for player 1)
The only player that participates in the second stage is the buyer of the patent in
the rst stage. The optimal investment for rm 1 is the value that maximizes his
prots considering his budget constraint and the price  paid for the patent on the
rst stage.
I 2 arg max
IB 
1 (I) : (5)
It is possible to write the FOC of this problem:
5
@1
@I
=
@c (I)
@I

@q1
@c (I)

P (Q)

1  1
"
S1

  c (I)

+ q1

@P (Q)
@Q
@q2
@c (I)
  1

 1  0;
where the term in brackets is zero given the Cournot FOC. Rewriting the optimality
condition
@1
@I
= q1
@c (I)
@I

@P (Q)
@Q
@q2
@c (I)
  1

  1  0:
For this stage, two cases may occur when considering the FOC:
i. the budget constraint is not binding (I < B   ) From the FOC, whenever
the Lagrange multiplier  = 0 (constraint is not binding):
@1
@I
= q1
@c (I)
@I

@P (Q)
@Q
@q2
@c (I)
  1

  1 = 0: (6)
Solving equation 6 leads to the optimal investment INB for the case where the
budget constraint does not a¤ect the Cournot market outcome. For the moment it
is assumed that there is a unique solution for this equation.
ii. the budget constraint is binding (I = B   ) From the FOC, whenever
the Lagrange multiplier  > 0 (constraint is binding):
@1
@I
= q1
@c (I)
@I

@P (Q)
@Q
@q2
@c (I)
  1

  1 > 0: (7)
Equation 7 indicates that the marginal prot of player 1 with respect to his
investment is still increasing at the optimal investment. Thus it turns out that the
solution is not interior and therefore it must be the case that IB = B   . So it is
possible to write a unique function that species the optimal investment for any B
I = min fINB; IB (; B)g :
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2.1.3 1st stage: Determining the willingness to pay
For the moment the discussion will abstract from the auction mechanism properties
and focus on price and willingness to pay.
Denition 1 The willingness to pay i for player i, i 2 f1; 2g, is the price for the
patent on the rst stage of the game that makes player i indi¤erent between buying
the patent or having the competing rm buy the patent at that price.
These values are investigated considering the two possible cases that the partici-
pants may be facing: (i) budget constraint is not binding, and (ii) budget constraint
is binding. These cases occur when the optimal investment given the initial budget
is respectively below or equal to the one considering unconstrained bidders.
i. the budget constraint is not binding For the moment, assume B is innite
so that rms are not bounded when investing. In this case, both his investment in
case he wins or the investment of his rival in case he loses are independent of the
price paid. The willingness to pay of player i for the case in which the constraint is
not binding for him, NB, is calculated by equating the payo¤ when he wins, 
W
i ,
with the one in case he loses, Li , for the optimal values,
W

i (I

NB; )  L

i (I

NB) = 0! NB:
ii. the budget constraint is binding Now assume I = B   . The willingness
to pay for player i for the case in which the constraint is binding for him, B, is
calculated by equating 1 and 2, but this time using:
W

i (I

i = B   )  L

i
 
Ij = B   

= 0! B (B) :
This willingness to pay B increases with budget increments until the constraint
becomes not binding; at this point, NB becomes constant with respect to budget
changes.
Denition 2 B  NB + INB. It is the minimum initial budget for a player at
which his budget constraint does not bind.
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An important issue to guarantee the stability of equilibrium for any initial budget
for the players is that this function  (B) is continuous at the value of B. Thus the
following lemma guarantees this continuity property and its proof is formalized on
the appendix.
Lemma 1 The function  (B) that is a mapping  : B  R+ ! R+ is strictly
increasing for B < B and continuous at the value of B for which the constraint
becomes not binding.
Proof. See appendix.
For symmetric budgets the following proposition is straightforward and no proof
is provided.
Proposition 1 The unique pure-strategy equilibrium outcome of either a FPA, SPA,
English or Dutch auction is  = *.
As the willingness to pay  is the unique NE for the case in which both players
have the same initial budget, any traditional auction mechanism would lead to the
same patent price and, thus, the same consumer surplus. As it will later be shown,
the additional feature of having di¤erent initial budgets that is presented in the next
section gives the problem multiple Nash Equilibria.
2.2 Asymmetric budgets: B1 > B2
Now it is assumed that players 1 and 2 have di¤erent budget constraints B1 and B2
respectively. Again, consider the buyer i pays  for the patent and on the second
stage of the model he invests Ii on the patent for reduction of the marginal cost
of production. After deciding the optimal investment, rms compete à la Cournot
during the third stage. There are three possibilities: (i) Players 1 and 2 have their
budget constraints not binding; (ii) Players 1 has the constraint not binding and
player 2 has it binding; (iii) Players 1 and 2 have the constraints binding.
In each of them the budget constraint only inuences the initial stage of the
game. Indeed, a player must evaluate his willingness to pay for the patent consid-
ering that in the second stage he will invest all the remaining budget whenever the
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optimal investment is inaccessible due to budget constraint or the optimal invest-
ment considering the gains of trade generated on the third stage by the reduction
on marginal cost. Hence the second and third-stage optimal strategies of the game
remain as in the previous section.
2.2.1 Budgets dont bind
This is the case in which both players have the initial budget above B. This implies
that any of them would be able to invest the optimal unconstrained amount in the
cost reduction during the second stage of the game whenever they win the auction.
Therefore their payo¤ functions are identical in case they are the winner (or loser)
since the value spent with the patent purchasing process (I + ) is identical. Thus
both players still have the same willingness to pay.
2.2.2 Both are budget constrained
This is the case in which both players have their initial budgets below B. The
willingness to pay for player i is still dened as the price for which W

i = 
L
i .
As B1 6= B2, it will usually be the case that these values are distinct, because for
player 1 both W

and L

are higher then for player 2. The player with the highest
willingness to pay is therefore unascertained.
Example: For this case the complete procedure will be exemplied by using the
linear inverse demand function P (Q) = a   bQ, and the marginal cost reduction
function c (I) = ce I . Table 2 represents the solutions for the second and third stages
of this game using the backward induction principle for both agents whenever player
i is the winner of the auctioned patent.
Table 2: 3rd and 2nd stages of game when B > B1 > B2.
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Player i is the winner
3rd stage qi =
a+c 2c(I1)
3b
qj =
a 2c+c(I1)
3b
2nd stage Ii = Bi   i
Winner WINi = b

a+c 2ce Bi+i
3b
2
 Bi
Loser LOSEj = b

a 2c+ce Bi+i
3b
2
1st stage: Determining the willingness to pay In order to choose the bids
for the auction the indi¤erence points between winning and losing the auction for
both players must be evaluated. Considering player i:
WINi = b

a+ c  2ce Bi+
3b
2
 Bi = b

a  2c+ ce Bj+
3b
2
= LOSEi :
From this equality one may obtain the indi¤erence value for player i:
i = ln
0@  
q
(2ce Bj 2ce Bi ae Bj 2ae Bi)2 3(4e 2Bi e 2Bj)(2ac 3bBi c2)
4ce 2Bi ce 2Bj
+
a(e Bj+2e Bi)+2c(e Bi e Bj)
4ce 2Bi ce 2Bj
1A (8)
Equation 8 determines the willingness to pay for both players considering the
case in which they are budget constrained4. The prot functions for players 1 and
2 are characterized on Figure 15, as well as both indi¤erence values.
In this case, the willingness to pay are usually distinct from each other and,
hence, there may exist cases in which player 2 is willing to pay more for the good
then player 1 even having less budget. It will later be shown that whenever 1 6= 2
there exist multiple equilibria, which makes the the choice of the auction format to
be used an interesting issue.
4Note that the willingness to pay may be higher then the total budget that a rm disposes.
This may change the outcome of the auctioning process, but nevertheless it is a tool that indicates
the intentions of the rm.
5All graphical illustratrions in the paper consider the linear inverse demand function P (Q) =
a  bQ, and the marginal cost reduction function c (I) = ce I .
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Patent Price
P
ay
of
f
Payoff 1 (win)
Payoff 1 (lose)
Payoff 2 (win)
Payoff 2 (lose) WTP1 WTP2
Figure 1: Example of prots whenever both are budget constrained
2.2.3 Player 1s constraint does not bind but player 2s does
In this case player 1 has the initial budget above B and player 2 has his initial
budget below this value. Note that if player 1 is the winner the prot functions for
both players behave as in the previous case, but when player 2 is the winner both
prots depend on his initial budget and also on the price paid for the patent.
Hence 1 and 2 will both depend on B2, and the prot functions for both players
whenever they are winners or losers in the auction for the patent are illustrated in
Figure 2. The willingness to pay for them are the values of  for which the prot
functions for the same player cross each other.
The gure above shows an important feature of this case that is also present in
the rst case: player 2 is indi¤erent between any price  paid by player 1 for the
patent whenever he is the loser. This happens because player 1 will always invest
his optimal value independently on his initial budget (which is higher then B) and
this will a¤ect player 2 on the Cournot market on the same way.
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Patent Price
P
ay
of
f
Payoff 1 (win)
Payoff 1 (lose)
Payoff 2 (win)
Payoff 2 (lose)
WTP1 WTP2
Figure 2: Example of prots whenever only one rm is budget constrained
2.2.4 Bidding strategy for FPA, SPA, English and Dutch auctions
This section mainly describes the expected di¤erences on the nal price for the
auction considering the traditional oral auctions: English and Dutch. As only two
completely informed players participate in the bidding process, these results may
be extended to equivalent closed auction formats: Second price auction (SPA) and
rst price auction (FPA) respectively (see Krishna, 2002 and Burguet, 2000).
To allow for the existence of equilibria and avoid open-set problems for all the
auction types it is necessary to implement a tie breaking rule.
Assumption 1: Consider 1 and 2 as the prices for the patent that makes
players 1 and 2 respectively indi¤erent between winning and losing the auction given
their budgets B1 and B2. The tie breaking rule gives the patent to player i whose
i = max f1; 2g in case of equal bids.
The sequel evaluation consider without loss of generality that i = max fi; jg,
i 6= j, i; j 2 I, which implies that the tie breaking rule denes player i as the winner
in case of bidding draw.
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The following proposition uses assumption 1 to obtain the set of NE in pure
strategies for all auction formats.
Proposition 2 All the values  2 [j; i] are NE strategies for the FPA, SPA,
English Auction and Dutch Auction considering the tie breaking rule.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 2 implies that for the cases in which both players are budget con-
strained, or one is so while his opponent is not, there exists multiple equilibria. For
the remaining case (both unconstrained) this equilibrium is unique because 1 = 2.
Which NE is the most powerful way to predict behavior? For sealed bid auctions,
this seems di¢ cult to answer. However, for open formats the sequential nature of
bidding can be used to obtain a more precise answer. The following formulations of
the open auction will be considered.
Assumption 2: The English auction starts with the auctioneer asking for the
lowest acceptable price P1 = 0, and proceeds by increasing the bid in predetermined
increments at each stage until one of the players is not willing to pay the current
price. At this moment the auction ends and the good is sold to the remaining player,
who pays the price at which his opponent dropped from the auction. Consider bn as
the unique bidder who plays at stage n and that bn = i when n is odd and bn = j
when n is even, and that the last possible price PN is su¢ ciently large that no
player would ever think about accepting it. The choice at period n may be to accept
or reject the current price, where accept takes the game to the next stage in which the
opponent has the same choice set the current price is incremented by ". If bn chooses
to reject, bn 1 wins the game and pays Pn 1. Conversely the Dutch auction starts
with the auctioneer asking a high price P1 which is lowered successively until one
participant is willing to pay the current price (or the predetermined minimum price
PN = 0 is reached). That participant pays the last announced price and receives the
good. Consider P1 su¢ ciently large that no player would ever think about accepting
it and the last possible price being zero. The choice at period n may be to accept or
reject the current price, where reject takes the game to the next stage in which the
opponent has the same choice set and the current price is decremented by ". If bn
chooses to accept he wins the game and pays Pn.
Given this background it is possible to obtain the subgame perfect equilibrium
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(SPE) for the English and Dutch auctions whenever both players are budget con-
strained and all  2 [j; i] represent NE6.
Proposition 3 Assume that i = max fi; jg, i 6= j, i; j 2 I. Given assumptions
1 and 2 the SPE for the English auction is i.
Proof. At PN no player accepts the o¤er due to its high value. Then at PN 1,
the other rm must choose between accepting or rejecting the current price given
that his opponent will reject at next stage. As PN 1 > 

bN 1, bN 1 prefers to reject
the current price. The same choice is taken by rm bN 2 at the next stage given
that PN 2 > 

bN 2. Now consider that Px is the rst price that is larger than i.
Suppose x is odd (bn = i): then by induction, player i prefers to reject at this stage
(and at any higher price). Knowing that i drops at stage x, player j also rejects
at stage x   1 because he doesnt want to win the auction and pay a value higher
than j. So at stage x  2 player i has to decide whether to accept or reject a price
Px 2 < i. As i is the willingness to pay for player i he considers protable to pay
any value below it, and so he accepts the current price. Then at stage x 2, knowing
that player i will accept on stage x   1, player j also accepts to maximize his nal
prots. Accordingly both of them accept all prices until it reaches P1. Now if x is
even (bx = j): at stage x+1 player i rejects given that Px+1 > i and, knowing this,
j also rejects at stage x. However i accepts the price at stage x  1 since Px 1 < i.
Again both of them accept all prices until it reaches P1. Therefore the equilibrium
price is somehow in [i   2"; i] when considering the even and odd values for x.
Making " su¢ ciently small in order to better represent a continuous case, one can
infer that the subgame perfect equilibrium for the English auction is i.
Proposition 4 Assume that i = max fi; jg, i 6= j, i; j 2 I. Given assumptions
1 and 2 the SPE for the Dutch auction is j.
Proof. At PN = 0 any player accepts the o¤er due to its low value. Then at
PN 1, the other rm must choose between accepting or rejecting the current price
given that his opponent will accept at next stage. As PN 1 < 

bN 1, bN 1 prefers to
accept the current price. The same choice is taken by rm bN 2 at the next stage
given that PN 2 < 

bN 2. Now consider that Px is the rst price that is smaller then
6Pitchik and Schotter (1988) designed an experiment to conrm that perfect equilibrium is a
good predictor of prices for sequential auctions with budget constrained bidders.
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j. Suppose x is odd (bx = i): then by induction, at stage x+1 (and subsequent lower
prices) player j accepts the price as Px+1 < j. Then at stage x (and subsequent
lower prices) player i prefers to accept because Px < i. Knowing that i accepts at
stage x, player j also rejects at stage x 1 because he doesnt want to win the auction
and pay a value higher than j. So at stage n  2 player i has to decide whether to
accept or reject a price Px 2 < i. Since he knows that his opponent will reject on
next stage he prefers to reject in order to win at stage x and pay a lower price. Then
at stage x   2 and all previous stages both of them reject all prices until it reaches
P1. Now if x is even (bx = j): at stage x player j accepts as Px < j. Knowing this
i accepts the price at stage x  1 since Px 1 < i. However player j rejects at stage
x 2 given that Px 2 > j. Again both of them reject all higher prices until it reaches
P1. Therefore the equilibrium price is somehow in [j; j + 2"] when considering the
even and odd values for x. Making " su¢ ciently small in order to better represent
a continuous case, one can infer that the subgame perfect equilibrium for the Dutch
auction is j.
Considering the relationship described previously it is possible to a¢ rm that
whenever both players are budget constrained andB1 6= B2, Dutch auction generates
a lower expected nal price when compared to the English auction. This conclusion
contradicts the one described by Krishna (2002) for the case of budget constrained
bidders. The reason for such a di¤erence is mainly that in the present case players
are asymmetric (B1 6= B2) and the loser has incentives to raise the price paid by his
opponent whereas in the traditional model this incentive is inexistent.
The next section describes how this di¤erent outcomes inuence the consumer
surplus (CS) and also imposes conditions for auction formats to generate higher CS
then others.
2.3 Welfare analysis
Cournot equilibrium maximizes a mixture of industry prots and the social welfare
as mentioned by Bergstrom and Varian (1985). This explains the willingness of
economists to understand the consequences of changes in both factors. The level of
social welfare may change within di¤erent market conditions such as the existence
of the patent. This section evaluates how di¤erent prices of the patent a¤ect the
consumers and rms.
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The aggregate consumer surplus is the sum of the welfare gained by consumers
when they engage trade. Traditionally it involves only the rst term on the right
hand side of equation 9. For the case of the auction it is assumed that the auctioneer
is a government who represents the consumers and therefore all money paid for the
patent is reverted to consumers7. The di¤erence in consumers surplus generated by
the introduction of the patent on the market is:
CS () =
Z Q()
0
(P (x)  P (Q ())) dx+  (9)
As it has been shown in last section, it is possible for the auctioneer to choose
a mechanism format that generates equilibrium prices at both extremes, i or j, of
the range of willingness to pay.
Therefore the study of the consumer surplus generated by nal prices being one
of these extreme values may provide information regarding the socially preferred
auction format. Of the three cases studied, the paper concentrates on the one when
both players are budget constrained8.
This case generates two possibilities:
- i = j: for this case there is only one equilibrium point considering all auction
mechanisms and is therefore less interesting for analysis;
- i > j: this is the case in which player i is willing to pay more for the patent
then player j;
In the last case, an English auction is the socially best alternative when the CS
is strictly monotone in . Now the slope of CS () is investigated
7Another possible explanation for the addition of the price paid for the patented innovation
on the consumer surplus is that the more the agents pay for this innovation, the more money the
companies have to invest in research.
8If both are not budget constrained there is a unique NE and thus any auction mechanism
leads to the same nal price. Whenever one is budget constrained while his opponent is not, it is
possible to prove that even existing multiple equilibria, the rened equilibrium will be the same if
1 > 2 for B1 > B2. This happens because the loser in the unconstrained situation receives the
same nal payo¤ independently on the price paid for the patent by his opponent. However this
case is interesting whenever 1 < 2 for B1 > B2 and follows the same reasoning as the studied
case.
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Lemma 2 In order to have monotonicity of CS () whenever both players are budget
constrained it must be the case that (2a  c)2   36b < 0. Moreover there existsb  B   ln 2c
2a c such that for  <
b ( > b) CS is concave (convex).
Proof. See appendix.
For the case of monotone CS (), low elasticity of demand and/or low intersect
a propitiates conditions for an increasing function CS (), which makes the English
auction a preferred auctioning mechanism as proven in proposition 4.
Proposition 5 If CS () is monotonous the English auction maximizes the con-
sumer surplus and therefore is the preferred format for the central government.
Proof. See appendix.
Whenever monotonicity is not guaranteed there may be circumstances in which
the Dutch auction generates a higher CS. Moreover it is possible that the patent
price that generates the highest expected CS is between i and j, which means
that a Dutch auction with reserve price (equal to this optimal price) should be the
elected auction format.
2.4 Conclusions
Auctions are economic mechanisms used to sell goods in a wide variety of markets.
Traditional studies of auctions consider that the players are able to pay their optimal
bid and also that the auction is an independent event. The example mentioned in
this paper refers to budget constrained rms competing on an auction for a patented
innovation that may give competitive advantages to its owner depending on the
amount invested on its development. This generates the problem of endogenous
determination of the willingness to pay, which depends on the initial budget of the
participants and also on subsequent aftermarket behavior.
For some of the studied cases, including the one with symmetrically budgeted
rms, the auction design does not inuence the nal equilibrium because there is
a unique pure strategy that satises Nash Equilibrium conditions among standard
formats. On the other hand there are few cases (i.e. when both rms are budget
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constrained) in which there are multiple equilibria in pure strategies that may occur.
Some of these equilibria are more predicteable than others depending on the auction
format elected by the auctioneer. The ascending open auction picks the highest
non-rationing price while the Dutch one denes the lower equilibrium value as the
patents price. This outcome is relatedto the fact that rms may have incentives to
bid above their willingness to pay given this market setting.
For cases in which a central authority is responsible for the auction format choice,
given his anti-trust position, it seems reasonable to elect the one that leads to
a higher aggregate consumer surplus. Considering the traditional concept of the
consumer surplus9 one can infer that increasing the price paid during the auction
is negativelly related to the CS and, therefore, the Dutch auction format should be
prefered. But when this price enters the CS formulation, it is possible to characterize
a monotonocity condition that guarantees the English auction as the optimal social
choice. Therefore it is crucial to understand the interdependence of the model
in order to dene an auction format that propitiates outputs that agree with the
auctioneers intentions.
3 Acknowlegment
I gratefully acknowledge the precious help and support from my supervisor, Roberto
Burguet. Finally, I am grateful to IGSOC for the nancial support. All errors are
my own responsibility.
4 Appendix
4.1 Lemma 1
Proof.
The function of the nal price on the auction given the budget constraint of the
players is given by:
 (B) =

B (B) , if B < B

NB, if B  B:
9CS () =
R Q()
0
(P (x)  P (Q ())) dx:
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By denition of continuity, the function  (B) : [0;1)  R ! R is continuous
at B if
lim
B!BMIN
B (B) = 

NB:
The rst step of the proof consists on determining the monotonicity of B (B)
for B 2 (0; B), being the implicit function theorem a tool for this evaluation. It
states that given F :MN  R2 ! R withM  R and N  R open sets. Suppose
(i) F 2 Cp, p  1 and (B; NB) 2M N such that (ii) F (B; NB) = 0 and (iii)
det
@F(B;NB)
@
6= 0. Then 9U  M open with B in U , 9V  N open with NB in
V and 9! : U ! V such that F (B;  (B)) = 0, 8B 2 U ,  2 Cp (U) and
d (B) =  

@F (B; NB)
@
 1
@F (B; NB)
@B
, 8B 2 U .
For the theorem to be valid:
(i) Construct F :M N  R2 ! R
F (B; ) = W (  B)  L (  B)
This function is of class C1 (D) because W and L are continuous functions in
 and B.
(ii) F (B; NB) = 0 by denition of the willingness to pay.
(iii) It turns out that
@F(B;NB)
@B
= 
W ( B)
@B
  L( B)
@B
. The rst term of this
equation is positive because if the winning rm disposes a higher budget, there is
more money to invest in cost reduction. As this is the case of budget constrained
rms, his prots are strictly increasing with investment. The opposite happens
to the last term of the equation: prots of the losing rm decrease as the budget
increases because, as this implies more investment of the winning rm, the costs of
the winning rm become lower on the Cournot market, leading to loses to the losing
rm. Hence
@F(B;NB)
@B
> 0.
Now
@F(B;NB)
@B
has the contrary inuence on the payo¤s given that, when the
budget is constrained, the more a rm pays for the patent represents less payo¤ for
himself and more for his opponent, leading to
@F(B;NB)
@B
< 0. So the condition for
inversion of the function
@F(B;NB)
@
is satised.
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Then d (B) =  

@F(B;NB)
@
 1
@F(B;NB)
@B
> 0, 8B 2 (0; B).
It is known that NB is constant for B  B and that the prot when B = 0
leads to the traditional Cournot prots, which are lower than the one when the
winning rm invests the optimal amount. So if continuity is shown, the monotonicity
property is also demonstrated. Thus the proof for continuity on B is made by
contradiction. Suppose  (B) is not continuous on B; then it must be the case of
(i) limB!B 

B (B) > 

NB or (ii) limB!B 

B (B) < 

NB. Considering equations 1,
2 and 5:
(i) This implies that for rm 1, limB!B I = B   B (B) < INB. But at the
limit the investment should be the same given that (I) is strictly convex and
continuous10 and has the optimal solution at I = INB. So limB!B 

B (B)  

NB:
(ii) This implies that for rm 1, limB!B I = B   B (B) > INB. But this
contradicts the fact that INB is the solution of the unconstrained maximization.
Then limB!B 

B (B)  

NB.
4.2 Proposition 1
Proof. First price auction
Best response:
For player i:
- For sj < i: bid si = sj;
- For sj = i: bid si [0; sj];
- For sj > i: bid si [0; sj)
For player j:
- For si < j: not dened;
- For si = j: bid sj 2 [0; si];
- For si > j: bid sj 2 [0; si].
Therefore the Nash Equilibria of this game are dened as all strategies si; sj 2
[j; i] such that si = sj.
10this is the reason why there is a unique solution for the maximization problem for the second
stage of the game
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Second price auction
Best response:
For player i:
- For sj < i: bid si 2 [sj;1);
- For sj = i: bid si 2 [sj;1);
- For sj > i: not dened;
For player j:
- For si < j: bid sj 2 (si;1);
- For si = j: bid sj 2 [si;1);
- For si > j: bid sj = si.
Therefore the Nash Equilibria of this game are dened as all strategies si; sj 2
[j; i] such that si = sj.
English auction
Game rule: Players bid real numbers subsequently and they are allowed to bid
the same value for the tie breaking rule to decide the winner.
Best response:
For player i:
- For sj < i: bid si = sj;
- For sj = i: bid si = sj or drop auction;
- For sj > i: drop auction.
For player j:
- For si < j: not dened;
- For si = j: bid sj = si;
- For si > j: bid sj = si.
Therefore the Nash Equilibria of this game are dened as all strategies si; sj 2
[j; i] such that si = sj.
Dutch auction
Game rule: Players may accept to pay the current real number by bidding it or
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they reject this price for the auction process to continue.
Best response:
For player i:
- For sj < i: bid si = sj;
- For sj = i: bid si = sj or reject;
- For sj > i: reject.
For player j:
- For si < j: not dened;
- For si = j: bid sj = si;
- For si > j: bid sj = si.
Therefore the Nash Equilibria of this game are dened as all strategies si; sj 2
[j; i] such that si = sj.
4.3 Marginal Consumer Surplus
The following analysis is related to the case in which players have di¤erent initial
budget and the constraint is binding for both of them. It is considered that the
consumer surplus has the price paid for the patent by the winner incorporated to it.
CS =
Z Q
0
(P (x)  P (Q)) dx+ ;
where P (Q) = a bQ, Q = 2a c ce B+
3b
. There have been studied the two possible
cases:
- Player i is the winner (i > j) and the equilibrium auction price is i;
- Player i is the winner (i > j) and the equilibrium auction price is j.
Matlab simulations for both cases have been taken and the following conclusions
were made: There is a positive correlation between the marginal consumer surplus
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and the maximum willingness to pay a, given that a > c. This may be explained by
the fact that increasing a implies on shifting the demand curve up, increasing the
total demand Q and thus the CS. However changes in the slope of the aggregate
demand function b inuence the consumer surplus in a negative manner. Therefore
the more elastic this aggregate demand function gets, the higher is the consumer
surplus. This occurs because as the parameter a is xed and the slope of the ag-
gregate demand function b decreases, the quantity produced in market equilibrium
increases and generates a comparatively smaller decrease in market prices.
4.4 Lemma 2
Proof. Developing the CS:
CS =
b
2

2a  c  ce I
3b
2
+ ;
where I = B    for the case of binding constraint. Then
CS =
b
2

2a  c  ce B+
3b
2
+ :
The FOC requires that @CS
@
= 0 for an interior solution
@CS
@
=
 ce B+
9b
 
2a  c  ce B++ 1 = 0:
After some manipulation
 = B + ln
2a  c
q
(2a  c)2   36b
2c
:
This equation has no real root for (2a  c)2   36b < 0.
Now checking the SOC:
@2CS
@2
=  ce
 B+
9b
 
2a  c  2ce B+ :
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Thus @
2CS
@2
> 0 (convex CS) implies that  < B + ln 2a c
2c
and @
2CS
@2
< 0 (concave
CS) implies  > B + ln 2a c
2c
.
4.5 Proposition 4
Proof. Consider i = max fj; ig. For i to be the equilibrium, meaning that the
English (also SPA) is the preferred for the central government, it is necessary that
@CS
@
> 0. So
@CS
@
=
 ce B+
9b
 
2a  c  ce B++ 1 > 0:
Given the monotonicity property for any  > 0, it is possible to use  = B in
order to nd a simple condition for such achievement. Then it must be the case in
which 9b   2c (a  c) > 0. The monotonicity property requires (2a  c)2   36b <
0 =) 9b > (2a c)2
4
. Thus the condition for the preference over the English auction
may also be written as (2a c)
2 8c(a c)
4
= (2a 3c)
2
4
> 0, which is always true. Therefore
given the monotonicity condition it is possible to a¢ rm that the English auction is
preferred.
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